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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to investigate attitude differences between violent 
and nonviolent offenders.  A random sample of 136 male prisoners in Oregon completed 
the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale, the 16-item Social Dominance Orientation scale, 
and the Multiple Stimulus Tolerance for Ambiguity scale to assess authoritarianism, 
social dominance orientation, and tolerance for ambiguity, respectively.  The Marlowe-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale, Form C, was also included as a validity measure.  
Results indicated no significant differences between violent and nonviolent offenders on 
the three attitude measures.  However, violent offenders scored significantly higher than 
nonviolent offenders on the social-desirability measure, suggesting that the lack of 
significant findings may reflect a desire to respond in a socially desirable way. 
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 Introduction 
In each of the past 10 years, over 1 million violent offenses came to the attention 
of law enforcement in the United States, resulting in approximately 500,000 arrests and 
thousands of sentences involving incarceration (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011).  
A nationwide study on all forms of recidivism indicated that 43.3% of offenders released 
in 2004 recidivated within 3 years (Pew Center on the States, 2011), though in Oregon, 
where the current study was conducted, only 22.8% of offenders released in 2004 
recidivated within 3 years (Pew Center on the States, 2011).    
The most recent data on violent recidivism showed that in 1994, the average 
violent offender served 3 to 4 years in prison but carried a high risk for reoffending upon 
release (Greenfield, 1995).  Of the approximately 60,000 violent offenders released from 
prison nationwide in 1994, almost 30% were rearrested for another violent offense within 
3 years (Langan & Levin, 2002).  Furthermore, violent offenders were 30% more likely 
than were nonviolent offenders to be rearrested for a violent offense within 3 years of 
release from prison (Langan & Levin, 2002).   
As states search for ways to reduce prison populations and maintain public safety, 
the need to accurately assess, predict, and manage violence risk in offender populations 
has become more urgent.  Mandatory sentencing laws, such as Oregon’s Measure 11, 
have become a popular way to deter violent crime and prevent violent recidivism among 
a number of states, but they often contribute to prison overcrowding and fiscal crises 
(Criminal Justice Commission, 2011).  In addition, of factors that have some ability to 
predict violence risk (e.g., psychopathy and demographic variables), none can fully 
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explain violent aggression, and relatively few are changeable characteristics (Dolan & 
Doyle, 2000; Harris & Rice, 2006). Thus, other approaches to reducing the risk of 
violence are needed.  For instance, attitudes may contribute to the risk of violence, yet 
they have often been overshadowed in research and practice by more stable and 
quantifiable risk factors (e.g., number of past violent offenses; Campbell, French, & 
Gendreau, 2009).  Attitudes can be addressed in treatment, whereas stable risk factors, 
including personality traits and disorders such as psychopathy, tend to be heritable and 
persistent despite environmental changes (Harris & Rice, 2006; Yang, Wong, & Coid, 
2010). 
The first step in investigating the relationship of these attitudes to violent 
offending is to determine whether and how they differ between individuals who have 
committed violent offenses and individuals who have not.  Thus, the purpose of this study 
was to examine attitude differences between violent and nonviolent offenders.  
Specifically, in this study I assessed personal and interpersonal attitudes that have been 
loosely associated with violence but not yet linked to violent behavior.   
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Literature Review 
 In this section, I discuss (a) the current state of violence risk assessment and the 
role of attitudes within it, (b) a theoretical model linking attitudes to violent behavior, and 
(c) the place of attitudes of authoritarianism, social dominance, and tolerance for 
ambiguity within this theoretical model.  
Violence Risk Assessment and Attitudes 
Risk assessment has evolved substantially over the past 20 years and has been 
conceptualized as having gone through several generations of change.  Campbell et al. 
(2009) described four generations of risk assessment: (a) clinical judgment alone, (b) a 
focus on static risk factors, (c) a combination of static and dynamic factors, and (d) 
individualized evaluation and management of multiple types of risk factors.  Although 
more recent developments in risk assessment are promising, research lags behind the 
creation of new measures (Campbell et al., 2009).  Some researchers have advocated for 
the use of actuarial second-generation measures alone because they are the most 
established and well-validated measures for risk assessment (Harris, Rice, & Quinsey, 
1993).  However, the focus on static predictive factors in actuarial measures (i.e., 
demographic, historical, and personality factors) leaves little room for therapeutic 
intervention, which in turn can lend itself to a self-fulfilling prophesy of ineffective 
treatment.   This approach contributes to a theoretical environment in which rehabilitation 
appears unproductive and incarceration appears to be a more viable means of preventing 
violence. 
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As an example of the focus on static factors, one of the most widely used risk 
assessment tools, the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG; Harris et al., 1993) is 
scored using historical factors (e.g., childhood adjustment and past criminal behavior) 
and a measure of psychopathy.  The VRAG has been shown to have good predictive 
validity, but historical factors cannot be changed and psychopathy has been noted to be 
resistant to treatment (Harris et al., 1993; Harris & Rice 2006; Yang et al., 2010).  Thus, 
although these static factors may be good predictors of violence, they may not be very 
helpful from a treatment or risk-management perspective.  There is a clear need to 
consider more changeable risk factors for violence (typically referred to as dynamic 
factors) in order to assess treatment response, change in risk over time, and the need for 
therapeutic (or legal) intervention (Douglas & Skeem, 2005). 
Recognition of these needs has led to increasing interest and research in the area 
of dynamic risk factors.  Meta-analyses have shown that dynamic risk factors such as 
antisocial attitudes and interpersonal conflict are as effective as static risk factors in 
predicting violence (Campbell et al., 2009; Gendreau, Little, & Goggin 1996).  Rice et al. 
(1993) found that, among forensic patients with symptoms of mental illness, procriminal 
attitudes were strongly correlated with violent recidivism. Further, research has suggested 
that prison treatment programs can effect significant change in attitudes (Walters, 
Trgovac, Rychlec, DiFazio, & Olson, 2002).  Overall, it appears that measurement of and 
intervention with certain attitudes could be very valuable in the area of risk assessment 
and management, but there is little evidence of a consensus in the field regarding which 
attitudes are most important and how they should be conceptualized.  Rather, researchers 
have called for the exploration of more factors and different conceptualizations in order 
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to better define the domain of criminogenic attitudes (Campbell et al., 2009; Douglas & 
Skeem, 2005).  In the following sections, I describe the theory and conceptualizations 
used in the current study. 
Theoretical Connection between Attitudes and Violent Offending 
 Although recent research has been focused on violent and nonviolent offender 
populations, much of the theory behind this research was derived from research on sexual 
offenders—a subset of violent offenders.  In an early study, Scott and Tetreault (1987) 
tested and supported the hypothesis that male sexual offenders would have the least 
progressive values toward women when compared with non-sex-related violent offenders 
and a nonincarcerated control group.  The researchers administered the Attitudes 
Towards Women Scale and found that, of the three groups, sexual offenders had the most 
conservative views of women and scored significantly lower than the control group on all 
five subscales.  However, the non-sex-related violent offenders also scored significantly 
lower than did the control group on two of the five scales.  The authors speculated that 
more general conservative value patterns could be associated with imprisonment. 
 Ward (2000) integrated later findings with Scott and Tetreault’s (1987) 
speculation on value patterns to establish a viable theory.  Researchers have demonstrated 
that sexual offenders possess moral reasoning abilities that are comparable to the abilities 
of nonincarcerated controls but that cognitive distortions that delay moral judgment are 
more prominent in sexual offenders (Van Vugt et al., 2008; Ward, Hudson, Johnson, & 
Marshall, 1997).  Ward (2000) argued that cognitive distortions that permit and 
perpetuate the use of sexual violence are not independent phenomena but rather are 
reflections of offenders’ broader beliefs (or theories) about the nature of their victims.  
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He stressed that, although sexual offenders may be capable of making appropriate moral 
judgments when prompted (e.g., It is always wrong to rape a woman), they often use 
cognitive distortions (e.g., She was asking for it because she dressed provocatively) to 
defer the use of moral reasoning and act on their underlying beliefs (e.g., Women should 
submit to men). Therefore, high propensity for the use of cognitive distortions (or moral 
justification) combined with hostile or demeaning attitudes toward victims (i.e., 
conservative views of women and children) may constitute high risk for sexual offending.  
Although this research was based on sexual offenders, it is possible that Ward’s (2000) 
conceptualization could apply to more general conservative values and more general 
violent offending. 
Authoritarianism and Social Dominance 
 Some evidence has suggested that authoritarianism—a trait comprised of 
conventionality, aggressiveness, and submission to authority—and social dominance—a 
trait consisting of the desire to dominate other groups—may represent underlying belief 
structures that could lead to violence if they were used in place of moral reasoning 
(Jackson & Gaertner, 2010).  Further, these attitudes are correlated with political-
economic conservatism and may mediate the correlation between conservatism and 
violent offending (Altemeyer, 2006; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994).  The 
Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale (Altemeyer, 1981, 2006), a measure of 
authoritarianism, and the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale (Pratto et al., 1994), 
a measure of social dominance, are well-validated measures that can be used to assess 
these traits.   
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There is already some evidence to suggest that both the RWA scale and the SDO 
scale are linked to cognitive distortions and aggression.  For example, McFarland (2005) 
examined how social dominance would interact with authoritarianism to bolster prowar 
attitudes.  He hypothesized that social dominance and authoritarianism would affect 
decision-making in different ways but that ultimately both traits would increase the extent 
to which individuals favored aggressive action.  In the week before the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, McFarland administered measures of social dominance, authoritarianism, 
blind patriotism, and perceptions of Iraq to 467 undergraduate psychology students.  Both 
social dominance and authoritarianism were correlated with blind patriotism and support 
for the war.  Only social dominance was correlated with decreased concern for the loss of 
human life, and only authoritarianism was correlated with increased perception that Iraq 
was a threat.  The author concluded that, although these traits operate through different 
channels (i.e., social dominance leads to a lack of empathy, whereas authoritarianism 
magnifies the fear of external threats), both traits increase support for aggressive action 
and together they can have a considerable effect on views related to war. 
Research on morality has helped to explain why McFarland (2005) found similar 
opinions but different motivations associated with social dominance and authoritarianism.  
Jackson and Gaertner (2010) hypothesized that social dominance and authoritarianism 
would each interact differently with moral disengagement mechanisms, four of which 
were assessed in their research: morally justifying the act, diminishing responsibility, 
minimizing consequences, and dehumanizing–blaming the victim.  The researchers tested 
their hypothesis with two studies, each with over 700 undergraduates as participants.  
Both studies included measures of authoritarianism, social dominance, and moral 
 8 
disengagement, but in one study the researchers measured support for the war in Iraq 
whereas in the other study the researchers measured support for war in a similar but 
hypothetical situation.  The participants completed measures of social dominance, 
authoritarianism, moral disengagement, and support of war.  
Jackson and Gaertner (2010) found that both social dominance and 
authoritarianism were positively correlated with the four moral disengagement 
mechanisms they studied, but authoritarianism had stronger correlations with them than 
did social dominance.  Social dominance was most strongly correlated with 
dehumanizing–blaming the victim, and authoritarianism was most strongly correlated 
with moral justification.  The researchers concluded that people scoring high on social 
dominance and authoritarianism made extensive use of moral disengagement 
mechanisms and that there was some differentiation between the groups in terms of 
which mechanisms they used most frequently.  This differential use of moral 
disengagement mechanisms may help to explain why those who score high on social 
dominance endorse different reasons for supporting aggression than do those who score 
high on authoritarianism, as found by McFarland (2005). In addition, Jackson and 
Gaertner’s results suggest that there may be a correlation between the two risk factors for 
violence proposed by Ward (2000): certain underlying beliefs (such as dominance and 
conservatism) and cognitive distortions (such as moral disengagement). 
 Given that those who score high on social dominance tended to employ moral 
disengagement and support aggressive acts more frequently than do those who score low 
on social dominance, Graham-Kevan (2011) sought to investigate this trait among 
individuals who commit criminal acts.  Graham-Kevan examined social dominance in a 
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correctional setting to assess whether social dominance was associated with actual 
interpersonal aggression.  The researcher’s hypotheses were that (a) inmates would score 
higher on social dominance than would individuals who were not in prison, (b) offenders 
would score higher on social dominance if their crimes involved approach of a victim 
than if the crimes did not involve approach, and (c) social dominance would correlate 
negatively with age and positively with lifetime incarceration rates, negative behavior, 
and resource-focused behavior.  The participants were 397 volunteer male inmates at a 
U.K. prison; each completed a social dominance measure as well as the Direct and 
Indirect Prisoner Behavior Checklist.  All of the hypotheses were supported.  The author 
concluded that social dominance was high among inmates and that this trait may play a 
significant role in inmate behavior. 
 Overall, authoritarianism and social dominance have both been associated with 
favoring aggressive action and moral disengagement (McFarland, 2005; Jackson & 
Gaertner, 2010).  In addition, social dominance has been associated with aggressive and 
violent behaviors in a forensic sample (Graham-Kevan, 2011).  Both authoritarianism and 
social dominance orientation fit into Ward’s (2000) model in that they represent hostile, 
disparaging attitudes towards other groups and are associated with cognitive distortions 
that affect moral reasoning (e.g., moral disengagement mechanisms).  Therefore, both of 
these attitudes were included in the present study because they may provide valuable 
information about attitude differences between violent and nonviolent offenders.  
Tolerance for Ambiguity 
Tolerance for ambiguity has typically been defined as the willingness to accept 
and cope with circumstances that are unclear or poorly understood (Arquero & Tejero, 
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2009; McLain, 2009). A lack of tolerance for ambiguity has been theoretically linked to 
both aggression and authoritarianism, but there is little research to support either of these 
associations (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; Kenny & Ginsberg, 1958b; Van Hiel, Onraet, & 
De Pauw, 2010).  Studies designed to establish direct links between tolerance for 
ambiguity and traits related to violence (e.g., authoritarianism and aggression) have 
generally been mixed or inconclusive (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; Kenny & Ginsberg, 
1958a, 1958b).  These past findings may have resulted from a lack of construct validity 
(e.g., conceptualizing intolerance for ambiguity as a feature of authoritarianism) and 
other psychometric weaknesses within the scales.  Over the past several decades, 
researchers have come to recognize authoritarianism and tolerance for ambiguity as 
distinct constructs, and a recent meta-analysis showed a small but significant positive 
correlation (r = .19; p < .001) between intolerance for ambiguity and authoritarianism 
(Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010).  Overall, there is some evidence that the two 
constructs are related, but distinct. 
There are three reasons to reexamine the possible relationship between tolerance 
of ambiguity and violence.  First, researchers have recently rejected and replaced 
measures of tolerance for ambiguity that were used in the bulk of past research (e.g., 
Walk’s Ambiguity Intolerance Scale and Budner’s Tolerance of Ambiguity Scale) due to 
psychometric problems (Arquero & Tejero, 2009).  McLain (1993) developed the 22-
item Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance Scale (MSTAT) in order to clarify 
the construct of ambiguity tolerance and address the psychometric deficiencies of prior 
measures.  He ensured that each of the questions addressed either ambiguity in general or 
one of the three basic features of the theoretical construct of ambiguity: “complexity, 
 11 
unfamiliarity or insolubility” (McLain, 2009, p. 978).  To create the MSTAT-II, McLain 
(2009) used item analysis to reduce the number of items from 22 to 13 and improve the 
measure’s reliability.  
A second reason to reexamine the possible relationship between tolerance of 
ambiguity and violence is that a construct similar to tolerance of ambiguity has been 
linked to aggression.  Researchers have found a negative correlation between aggression 
and curiosity, (defined by Kashdan et al. [2013] as “the degree to which people tend to 
seek out new knowledge and experiences, and their willingness to tolerate the novelty 
and uncertainty of their environment,” p. 13), a construct that shares features with 
tolerance for ambiguity (Kashdan et al., 2013).  Kashdan et al. assessed 64 
undergraduates for general curiosity and aggressive inclinations in the context of 
romantic relationships (aggressive inclinations were assessed as the amount of time 
subjects would blast noise at their partners after winning the privilege to do so in a 
button-pressing game).  The researchers found a significant negative correlation between 
curiosity and aggression (r = -.27, p = .03).  In a follow-up study with 110 undergraduate 
subjects, the researchers investigated whether curiosity was related to aggression toward 
individuals who hurt subjects’ feelings (assessed by a self-report questionnaire that 
required subjects to rate the intensity of hurt feelings and the nature of their response).  
Again, curiosity was significantly and negatively correlated with aggression.  These 
results are consistent with the idea that low tolerance for ambiguity may be one of many 
factors that contribute to the risk of violent aggression. 
A final reason to reexamine the possible relationship between tolerance for 
ambiguity and violence is that tolerance for ambiguity fits into Ward’s (2000) model; that 
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is, intolerance for ambiguity is an attitude that would facilitate avoidance of moral 
reasoning due to the complexity and ambiguity such reasoning inherently involves.  In 
sum, the availability of a new measure for tolerance of ambiguity, the association of a 
similar construct (curiosity) with aggression, and the fit of tolerance for ambiguity within 
Ward’s theory warrant the inclusion of tolerance for ambiguity in this study. 
Purpose of the Current Study 
 The purpose of this study was to explore the extent to which attitudes related to 
aggression differ in violent and nonviolent offenders.  In past research on violence risk, 
criminogenic attitudes have been defined and assessed in a number of different ways, but 
not in the way they were defined and assessed in the present study.  Using Ward’s (2000) 
model and existing research on attitudes and aggression as a guide, I identified three 
attitudes that may play important roles in violent aggression: authoritarianism, social 
dominance orientation, and tolerance for ambiguity. These attitudes were examined in a 
group of violent and nonviolent offenders in order to assess whether there would be 
differences in the extent to which each group endorsed each of these attitudes.  Any such 
differences may be helpful in differentiating violent and nonviolent offenders and 
ultimately in identifying helpful interventions.  In addition, the results add to the growing 
literature on attitudes and aggression and help to guide future research. 
 13 
Method 
 
Participants 
 The initial sample consisted of 149 English-speaking, male inmates at Coffee 
Creek Correctional Facility  (CCCF) who had passed the facility’s reading test (indicating 
they read at an eighth-grade level or higher) and who were age 18 years or over.  As the 
state prison intake facility, CCCF only houses inmates for the first 3 to 4 weeks of their 
incarceration.  Of the original 149 participants, 10 were dropped from the study due to 
incomplete or obviously falsified surveys.  Data for an additional two participants were 
dropped due to their scores on the validity measure (1.5 SD above the mean), and one 
participant withdrew.  Data from the remaining 136 participants were included in the 
study.  Half of the sample (68 participants) consisted of violent offenders for their most 
recent index offense—defined as individuals incarcerated for a person crime—and half 
the sample (68 participants) consisted of nonviolent offenders—defined as individuals 
incarcerated for a property crime.  Aside from convictions related to the current 
incarceration, no information regarding previous crimes or incarceration was available. 
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 68 years, with an average age of 35.5 years 
(SD = 10.67).  The sample was predominantly White, and the age and race composition 
of the sample was similar to that of the ODOC total male population (see Table 1).  As 
shown in Table 2, among violent offenders in the sample, sex offenses (e.g., Rape, 
Sodomy, Sex Abuse) were the most common offense type, followed by Assault and 
Robbery.  These percentages were not significantly different from the percentages of 
violent offense type for the ODOC total male population (see Table 2). However, the 
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sample contained no inmates convicted of Murder and only one individual convicted of 
Negligent Homicide.  The most common offense among nonviolent offenders in the 
sample was Burglary, followed by Theft and Vehicle Theft.  There were no significant 
differences between the sample percentages and the nonviolent offense type percentages 
for the ODOC total male population (see Table 2). 
Table 1 
 
Race/Ethnicity and Age of ODOC Total Male Population as of July 1, 2013, and 
Current Sample 
 
  ODOC Male 
Inmates 
(N = 13,347) 
% 
Sample 
(N = 136) 
% 
 
Race 
 
White 
 
72.5 
 
 
79.4 
 African American   9.6   9.6 
 Hispanic 14.1   7.4 
 Native American   2.4   2.2 
 Asian   1.4   1.5 
 
Age 
 
18 to 24 
 
11.9 
 
17.6 
  
25 to 30 
 
18.8 
 
21.3 
  
31 to 45 
 
39.9 
 
47.1 
  
46 to 60 
 
23.6 
 
11.8 
  
60 and Older 
 
 
  5.8 
 
  2.2 
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Table 2 
 
Offense Type for ODOC Total Male Population as of July 1, 2013, and Current Sample 
 
 
 
Offense 
 ODOC Male 
Inmates 
(N = 13,347) 
 % 
Sample 
(N = 136) 
% 
Z (p value) 
 
Violent 
 
n (%) 
 
Sex Offenses 
 
9,378 (70.3%) 
 
39.5 
 
68 (50%) 
 
35.3 
 
 
 
 0.71 (.477) 
  
Assault 
 
18.9 
 
26.5 
 
-1.59 (.119) 
  
Robbery 
 
16.2 
 
13.2 
 
  0.67 (.503) 
  
Kidnapping 
 
  3.6 
 
  5.9 
   
-1.00 (.317) 
  
Other 
 
 
21.8 
 
19.1 
 
  0.53 (.596) 
 
Nonviolent 
 
n (%) 
 
Burglary 
 
2,291 (17.2%) 
 
53.7 
 
68 (50%) 
 
45.6 
 
 
 
 1.33 (.184) 
  
Theft 
 
30.7 
 
35.3 
 
 1.00 (.317) 
  
Vehicle Theft 
 
12.9 
 
 8.8 
   
  0.99 (.322) 
  
Criminal Mischief 
 
  -- 
 
 7.4 
   
N/A 
  
Forgery 
 
 
  1.2 
 
2.9 
   
-1.30 (.194) 
 
Measures 
 Authoritarianism.  Authoritarianism was assessed using the most recent form of 
the RWA scale (Altemeyer, 2006; Appendix A).  Altemeyer (1981) designed the RWA 
scale as a modernized measure of the authoritarian personality construct developed in the 
1940s and 1950s.  Previous measures, including the California F-scale (Adorno, Frenkel-
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Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), were met with criticism due to bias and poor 
psychometric properties.  Altemeyer’s original scale was designed to tap into three 
features of authoritarianism: authoritarian aggression (aggression towards 
nonconformists), authoritarian submission (obedience to established authority), and 
conventionalism (adherence to social conventions). The scale has been updated several 
times, but it retains good psychometric properties.  The most recent form contains 22 
items (e.g., The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best 
way to live; Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions 
eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs) rated on a 9-point Likert scale 
ranging from -4 (very strongly disagree) to +4 (very strongly agree).  There are no 
categories or cutoffs for the RWA scale.  Possible scores range from 20 to 180, with 
lower scores indicating less authoritarian attitudes and higher scores indicating more 
authoritarian attitudes.  The RWA scale has been demonstrated to have good validity 
when compared to measures of similar constructs, including prejudice and attitudes 
towards violence (Altemeyer, 1981, 1996; Benjamin, 2006).  Studies on internal 
consistency have yielded alphas from .84 to .94, with most at the high end of that range 
(Altemeyer, 1996; Rattazzi, Bobbio, & Canova, 2007).  Although the scale is intended to 
be unidimensional, factor analyses have demonstrated possible support for two- and 
three-factor models (Funke, 2005; Rattazzi et al., 2007).  Regardless, the RWA scale has 
been considered to be the gold standard for the assessment of authoritarianism (Funke, 
2005).  This scale was used with caution in the present study because it has not been used 
with correctional populations in past research. 
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 Social Dominance.  Social Dominance was assessed using the 16-item version of 
the SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Appendix B).  The SDO scale was created to measure 
the desire for between-group discrimination and hierarchy among social groups (Pratto et 
al., 1994; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006).  The items (e.g., It would be good if groups 
could be equal; Inferior groups should stay in their place) are rated on a 7-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive).  Possible scores range from 16 
to 112 with lower scores indicating less social dominance and higher scores indicating 
more social dominance.  There are no cutoffs or categories for the SDO scale.  The 16-
item version has shown good reliability and validity.  In studies with multiple samples 
taken across several nations, reliability was high (r = .83), as were construct validity 
comparisons with sexism (r = .51) and ethnic prejudice (r = .41; Pratto et al., 2006).  In 
addition, the SDO has good discriminant validity when compared to the RWA scale 
(alphas range from .22 to .23) and measures of interpersonal dominance in Americans 
(Altemeyer, 1996; Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto et al., 2006).  This measure has also 
demonstrated good validity for prisoner populations (Graham-Kevan, 2011).  Overall, 
Graham-Kevan (2011) concluded that the SDO scale is a well-validated measure that is 
appropriate for use with incarcerated individuals. 
 Tolerance for Ambiguity.  The MSTAT-II was used to assess tolerance for 
ambiguity (Appendix C).  The scale contains 13 items (e.g., I dislike ambiguous 
situations; I prefer familiar situations to new ones) rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  Possible scores range from 13 to 65, 
with lower scores indicating lower tolerance for ambiguity and higher scores indicating 
higher tolerance for ambiguity.  There are no cutoff scores or categories for the MSTAT-
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II.  Factor analysis confirmed that the MSTAT-II could represent a one-dimensional 
theoretical model, and internal consistency reliability was .83 (McLain, 2009).  Construct 
validity was difficult to assess due to similar measures’ psychometric problems, but 
correlations with these measures have ranged from .09 (Budner Ambiguity Intolerance) 
to .41 (MacDonald AT-20 Ambiguity Tolerance; McLain, 2009).  Overall, the MSTAT-II 
has acceptable validity and reliability scores, suggesting it has adequate psychometric 
properties for general use.  The MSTAT-II has not been used with correctional 
populations in the past so it was interpreted with caution in this study. 
 Social Desirability.  The 13-item Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, 
Form C (MC-C) was used to assess social desirability (Reynolds, 1982; Appendix D).  
The items (e.g., I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way; I’m always willing to 
admit it when I make a mistake) are rated True or False.  Possible scores range from 0-13, 
with low scores indicating less socially desirable responding and higher scores indicating 
more socially desirable responding.  There are no cutoff scores or categories for the MC-
C.  The estimated reliability (r =.76) and construct validity (r = .93) for the MC-C are 
high and indicate that the measure is acceptable for general use (Andrews & Meyer, 
2003).  Additionally, Andrews and Meyer (2003) validated the MC-C with a sample of 
individuals involved in forensic evaluations.  The researchers found the MC-C had a high 
positive correlation with the MC (r = .91) when evaluating these individuals.  Further, 
they found that forensic populations had a significantly higher mean score (M = 7.61, SD 
= 3.33) than did nonforensic populations (M = 5.37, SD = 3.13) on the MC-C.  Overall, 
Andrews and Meyer (2003) demonstrated that the MC-C has strong psychometric 
properties and is appropriate for use as a validity measure with forensic populations. 
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Procedure 
 Prior to data collection, the current study was approved by both the Oregon 
Department of Corrections (ODOC) Research Committee and the Pacific University 
Institutional Review Board.  ODOC staff provided a randomly generated list of names of 
inmates who met the inclusionary criteria.  All inmates who met inclusion criteria were 
invited to participate.  Inmates were sent to a classroom in groups of 15 to 20 by 
correctional staff.  I verbally reviewed the Informed Consent form (Appendix E) with the 
group and informed the inmates that if they chose to participate they would be able to 
withdraw from the study at any time prior to handing in the completed surveys. After 
those who declined to participate left the room (response rate was not recorded), I 
verbally reviewed the four surveys with the inmates who agreed to participate and 
answered any questions they had.  After signing the Informed Consent form, participants 
completed identical packets, which consisted of all the measures in the following order: 
RWA scale, MSTAT-II scale, SDO scale, and MC-C scale.  I recorded an identification 
number on each of these instruments.  Each participant handed in his packet and left the 
room when he was finished. 
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Results 
 Independent-samples t tests were used to evaluate each of the following 
hypotheses: (a) violent offenders would score higher than nonviolent offenders on the 
RWA scale, (b) violent offenders would score higher than nonviolent offenders on the 
SDO scale, and (c) violent offenders would score lower than nonviolent offenders on 
MSTAT-II scale.  In addition, a t test was used to determine whether there was a 
significant difference between violent and nonviolent offenders’ scores on the MC-C.  
The current study did not include a hypothesis regarding the MC-C, but analysis of the 
measure was included to assess response style.  A significant result would imply that one 
offender group was more motivated that the other group to provide socially desirable 
responses, which in turn would challenge the validity of the other three analyses. 
 Before conducting a t test for the first hypothesis, the data were tested to 
determine whether the homogeneity of variance assumption was violated.  The Levene’s 
test for the equality of variance was not significant (F = 2.3, p = .14), so equal variances 
were assumed.  The first hypothesis that violent offenders would score higher than 
nonviolent offenders on the RWA scale was not supported: Violent offenders (M = 90.60, 
SD = 26.66) on average scored lower, though not significantly lower, than nonviolent 
offenders (M = 92.75, SD = 22.43) on the RWA scale, t(134) = .51, p = .61.  As noted 
above, there are no categories or descriptive ranges for the RWA scale, but both of the 
groups in the current study scored in the middle of the possible range (20 to 180).  The 
95% confidence interval for the difference in means ranged from -6.20 to 10.51.  The eta-
squared (η2 = 0.002) effect size index was small and indicated that 0.2% of the variance 
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in the score on the RWA scale was accounted for by the nature of the offense.  Before 
conducting the t test the data for the second hypothesis, the data were tested to determine 
whether the homogeneity of variance assumption was violated.  The Levene’s test for the 
equality of variance was not significant (F = .15, p = .70), so equal variances were 
assumed. The second hypothesis that violent offenders would score higher than 
nonviolent offenders on the SDO scale was not supported: Violent offenders (M = 44.06, 
SD = 16.90) on average scored lower, though not significantly lower, than nonviolent 
offenders (M = 46.57, SD = 16.54) on the SDO scale, t(134) = .88, p = .38.  As noted 
earlier, there are no categories for scores on the SDO, but both groups scored in the 
middle of the possible range of scores (16 to 112).  The 95% confidence interval for the 
difference in means ranged from -3.16 to 8.19.  The eta-squared (η2 = 0.006) effect size 
index was small and indicated that 0.6% of the variance in the score on the SDO scale 
was accounted for by the nature of the offense. 
 Before conducting the t test the data for the third hypothesis, the data were tested 
to determine whether the homogeneity of variance assumption was violated.  The 
Levene’s test for the equality of variance was significant (F = 4.22, p = .04), so equal 
variances were not assumed, and the t test values were adjusted accordingly.  The third 
hypothesis that violent offenders would score lower than nonviolent offenders on 
MSTAT-II scale was not supported: Violent offenders (M = 41.87, SD = 9.29) on average 
scored slightly, though not significantly, lower than nonviolent offenders (M = 42.75, SD 
= 7.09) on the MSTAT-II scale, t(125.24) = .62, p = .54.  As noted above, no categories 
or cutoff scores exist for the SDO scale, but both means were above the average possible 
score of 39.  The 95% confidence interval for the difference in means ranged from -1.92 
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to 3.69.  The eta-squared (η2 = 0.003) effect size index was small and indicated that 0.3% 
of the variance in the score on the MSTAT-II scale was accounted for by the nature of the 
offense. 
 Before interpreting the t test for the data for the MC-C social desirability scale, 
the data were tested to determine whether the homogeneity of variance assumption was 
violated.  The Levene’s test for the equality of variance was not significant (F = .07, p = 
.79), so equal variances were assumed.  The t test was significant, t(134) = 2.25, p = .026.  
Violent offenders (M = 7.43, SD = 3.38) on average scored significantly higher than 
nonviolent offenders (M = 6.15, SD = 3.30) on the MC-C scale.  As noted above, there 
are no cutoff scores or categories for the MC-C scale, but both groups means were near 
the middle of the possible range of scores (0 to 13).  The 95% confidence interval for the 
difference in means ranged from .15 to 2.42.  The eta-squared (η2 = 0.036) effect size 
index was small and indicated that 3.6% of the variance in the score on the MC-C scale 
was accounted for by the nature of the offense. 
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Discussion 
 
 Despite previous studies that indicated a connection between aggression and the 
attitudes investigated in this study—authoritarianism (McFarland, 2005; Jackson & 
Gaertner, 2010), social dominance (Graham-Kevan 2011; Jackson & Gaertner, 2010), 
and tolerance for ambiguity (Kashdan et al., 2013; Van Hiel, et al., 2010), the results of 
the current study indicated no significant differences between violent and nonviolent 
offenders on any of the attitude measures.   
 Looking specifically at the first hypothesis, the current results did not support the 
hypothesis that violent offenders would score higher than nonviolent offenders on the 
RWA scale measuring authoritarianism.  The difference between these groups was not 
significant, indicating that there was no difference between violent and nonviolent 
offenders in terms of authoritarianism.  However, it is worth noting that, contrary to the 
hypothesis, on average nonviolent offenders actually scored slightly (though not 
significantly) higher than violent offenders on the RWA scale (M = 92.75 and 90.60, 
respectively).  There are no official cutoff scores or categories for the RWA scale, but 
scores of approximately 90 are considered average for adults in the United States 
(Altemeyer, 2006).  Although previous researchers found that authoritarianism was 
linked to prowar attitudes and moral disengagement (Jackson & Gaertner, 2010; 
McFarland, 2005), the current results indicate that authoritarianism was not directly 
associated with the perpetration of violent crimes.  Thus, the findings do not contradict 
prior research, but they fail to extend prior associations between authoritarianism and 
proviolent attitudes to a correlation between authoritarianism and violent crimes. 
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The current results also failed to support the second hypothesis that violent 
offenders would score higher than nonviolent offenders on the SDO scale measuring 
social dominance.  The findings indicate that violent offenders and nonviolent offenders 
did not differ significantly on social dominance orientation.  The means for the violent 
and nonviolent offenders indicate that contrary to the hypothesis, on average nonviolent 
offenders scored slightly (though not significantly) higher than violent offenders on the 
SDO scale (M = 46.57and 44.06, respectively).  There are no cutoff scores or categories 
for the SDO scale, but the means were somewhat lower than those obtained in Graham-
Kevan’s (2011) sample of violent and nonviolent offenders (M = 52.87, SD = 16.24 and 
M = 49.26, SD = 15.01, respectively).  These results are surprising given that Graham-
Kevan found support for a relationship between social dominance orientation and violent 
behavior prior to and during incarceration.  Cultural differences may have influenced 
these divergent results, as the previous study was conducted in the United Kingdom 
whereas the current study was in the United States.  Also, Graham-Kevan’s study 
included a sample size of 397 inmates, which increased the power and thus the sensitivity 
to small differences relative to the current study’s sample size of 136 inmates. 
Finally, the current results did not support the third hypothesis that violent 
offenders would score significantly lower on the MSTAT-II—a measure of tolerance for 
ambiguity—than would nonviolent offenders. On average, violent offenders scored 
slightly (though not significantly) lower than nonviolent offenders (M = 41.87 and 42.75, 
respectively), which indicates that violent and nonviolent offenders showed comparable 
levels of tolerance for ambiguity.  There are no cutoff scores for the MSTAT-II, but these 
means were similar to the means of other groups who have taken the MSTAT-II, 
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including students (M = 41.6 SD = 7.6; McLain, 2009) and firefighter-emergency medical 
technicians (M = 44.0, SD = 7.18; McLain, 2009).  Despite the use of a psychometrically 
improved measure, the results were congruent with previous studies that showed no 
support for a relationship between aggression and tolerance for ambiguity (Frenkel-
Brunswik, 1949; Kenny & Ginsberg, 1958a; Kenny & Ginsberg, 1958b). 
Of note, violent offenders scored significantly higher than nonviolent offenders 
on the MC-C social desirability scale (M = 7.43 and 6.15, respectively).  The violent 
offenders’ mean was closer than was the nonviolent offenders’ mean to previously 
established forensic norms for the MC-C (M = 7.61, SD = 3.32; Andrews & Meyer, 
2003).  This group difference on the MC-C indicates that violent offenders may have 
been more motivated than nonviolent offenders to portray themselves in a positive light, 
which could have lowered their scores on the RWA scale and the SDO and inflated their 
scores on the MSTAT-II.  No standard adjustments are available to correct other attitude 
measures based on high scores on the MC-C, but the significant difference in validity 
scores between the two groups does challenge the validity of the results for the other 
measures. 
Strengths and Limitations 
 The present study had several strengths.  First, it included a random sample of all 
male inmates entering the Oregon prison system over the course of several weeks.  
Second, the study was conducted at an intake facility, meaning that many variables, 
including time spent in prison during this incarceration, facility differences, and security 
level, were controlled.  Third, the study included a relatively large sample size of 136 
participants.  Fourth, I included a validity scale to ensure that participants who attempted 
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to portray themselves in an unrealistically positive light were dropped from the study.  In 
addition, the validity scale informed the interpretation of the other scales.  Fifth, this was 
the first study to include the RWA scale, the SDO scale, and the MSTAT-II together, as 
well as the first to use the RWA scale and the MSTAT-II on a prison population. 
 The limitations of the present study are numerous.  First, all of the measures used 
were shortened versions of longer measures.  Although each shortened version had ample 
empirical support, shorter measures have less reliability and can decrease statistical 
differences between groups as compared to longer versions.  Second, due to the limited 
number of inmates who met the criteria for inclusion and agreed to participate, the 
sample size was substantially lower than was originally planned, which limited the power 
of the statistical analysis.  Third, there was no systematic way to adjust the attitude 
measure scores based on the validity measure scores.  As a result, the attitude measures 
were treated as equally valid regardless of whether participants attempted to answer the 
survey in a socially desirable manner (although participants who scored 1.5 standard 
deviations above the mean on the MC-C were dropped from the study).   
A fourth limitation was that no data were collected regarding past contact with the 
criminal justice system, which means variables such as prior offenses and previous time 
served in prison were not controlled.  Therefore, individuals in the nonviolent group may 
have in fact had prior charges or convictions for violent offenses.  In addition, total time 
spent in prison over each participant’s lifetime may have differed between the groups; I 
was unable to test this possibility because I had no data on lifetime incarceration.  
Finally, the response rate of the participants was not recorded in the current study, and a 
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number of inmates refused to participate.  The inmates who did participate may have 
differed in some important way from those who refused participation. 
Directions for Future Research 
 Future research in this area should feature improved psychometric quality and 
control for additional variables.  The sample size in the current study may have been too 
small to detect significant differences, so the use of a larger sample size may be helpful.  
Also, a systematic correction for response style may assist future researchers in 
controlling a significant source of bias.  It may also be useful for future researchers to 
include variables associated with lifetime contact with the criminal justice system or to 
verify that participants with nonviolent offenses did not have violent past offenses.  
Analyzing offender group differences based on past convictions and total time served in 
prison may provide evidence of confounding variables that could be examined.  Also, 
further analysis could be conducted to investigate the extent to which the attitudes of 
interest are associated with age, race, gender, and other demographic variables.  
In addition, it may be useful for future researchers to address the difference 
between violent and nonviolent offenders in their performance on social desirability 
measures.  Differences in response style between violent and nonviolent offenders could 
prove to be an important correlate in differentiating between the two groups as well as a 
consideration in the interpretation of other psychological measures. 
Implications 
 Overall, violent and nonviolent offenders did not differ significantly on the 
measures of authoritarianism, social dominance, and tolerance for ambiguity 
administered in this study.  Thus, this study offers no support for the use of Ward’s 
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(2000) model as a model for violent offending.  However, the results do add to the 
literature on the connection between attitudes and violent offending and may encourage 
future researchers to explore different attitudes as possible predictors of violence.  In 
addition, this study did yield significant results on the social desirability measure, which 
warrants further research into response style differences between violent and nonviolent 
offenders. 
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Appendix A 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Altemeyer, 2006) 
 
NOTE:  Response scale: +4, +3, +2, +1, 0, -1, -2, -3, -4.  Positive and negative signs 
represent agreement and disagreement, respectively, and numbers denote extent from 
slightly (1) to very strongly (4). 
1.  The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the 
 radicals and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance. 
2.  Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married. 
3.  Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to 
 destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. 
4.  Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. 
5.  It is better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion 
 than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create 
 doubt in people’s minds. 
6.  Atheist and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt 
 every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. 
7.  The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our 
 traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silences the 
 troublemakers spreading bad  ideas. 
8.  There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. 
9.  Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if 
 this upsets many people. 
10.  Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating 
 away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs. 
11. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, 
 even if it makes them different from everyone else. 
12.  The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to 
 live. 
13.  You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by 
 protesting for women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school 
 prayer. 
14.  What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and 
 take us back to our true path. 
15.  Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our 
 government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are suppose 
 to be done.” 
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16.  God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed 
 before  it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished. 
17.  There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin 
 it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. 
18.  A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants it to be.  The days when women 
 are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past. 
19.  Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the 
 authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining 
 everything. 
20.  There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way. 
21.Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy 
 “traditional family values.” 
22.  This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just 
 shut up and accept their group’s traditional place in society 
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Appendix B 
 
Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) 
 
NOTE: Response scale is from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive). Items 9-16 are 
reverse scored. 
1.  Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
2.  In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups. 
3.  It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. 
4.  To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
5.  If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
6.  It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom. 
7.  Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
8.  Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
9.  It would be good if groups could be equal. 
10.  Group equality should be our ideal. 
11.  All groups should be given an equal chance in life. 
12.  We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
13.  Increased social equality is beneficial to society. 
14.  We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. 
15.  We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. 
16.  No group should dominate in society. 
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Appendix C 
Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance Scale-II (McLain, 2008) 
NOTE: Response scale is from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  Items marked 
with an “R” are reverse scored. 
____ 1. I don’t tolerate ambiguous situations well. R 
____ 2. I would rather avoid solving a problem that must be viewed from several 
 different perspectives. R 
____ 3. I try to avoid situations that are ambiguous. R 
____ 4. I prefer familiar situations to new ones. R 
____ 5. Problems that cannot be considered from just one point of view are a little 
 threatening. R 
____ 6. I avoid situations that are too complicated for me to easily understand. R 
____ 7. I am tolerant of ambiguous situations. 
____ 8. I enjoy tackling problems that are complex enough to be ambiguous. 
____ 9. I try to avoid problems that don’t seem to have only one “best” solution. R 
____ 10. I generally prefer novelty over familiarity. 
____ 11. I dislike ambiguous situations. R 
____ 12. I find it hard to make a choice when the outcome is uncertain. R 
____ 13. I prefer a situation in which there is some ambiguity. 
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Appendix D 
Marlow-Crown Social Desirability Scale, Form C (Reynolds, 1982) 
Response scale: Respondents mark each statement True or False. 
 
____ 1.  It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. 
____ 2.  I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way. 
____ 3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little 
 of my ability.  
____ 4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even 
  though I knew they were right. 
____ 5. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener. 
____ 6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 
____ 7. I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
____ 8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
____ 9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
____ 10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my 
 own. 
____ 11. There have times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. 
____ 12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 
____ 13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings. 
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Appendix E 
Informed Consent 
     
 
 
1. Study Title 
Attitudes Related to Aggression in Violent and Nonviolent Offenders 
 
2. Study Personnel 
Name Chelsea Hagen, BA Genevieve Arnaut, PsyD, PhD  
Role Principal Investigator Faculty Advisor  
Institution Pacific University Pacific University  
Program School of Professional Psychology 
School of Professional 
Psychology  
Email hage6676@pacificu.edu arnaut@pacificu.edu  
Telephone (503) 352-2900 (503) 352-2900  
 
3. Study Invitation, Purpose, Location, and Dates 
You are invited to participate in a research study about different types of attitudes 
among prisoners.  The project will be completed by August 2013.  The study will take 
place at Coffee Creek Correctional Facility.  The results of this study will be used to 
learn about attitude differences among prisoners who are incarcerated for different 
types of offenses. 
4. Participant Characteristics and Exclusionary Criteria 
You can participate in this study if you are male, at least 18 years old, and can speak 
and read English at the eight-grade level.  You cannot participate if you are younger 
than 18 years old or cannot speak or read at the eighth-grade level. 
5. Study Materials and Procedures 
You will be asked to fill out four surveys.  Each survey will ask you questions about 
different attitudes or opinions.  About 250 other inmates like you will participate in 
the study.  Participation will take about 45-60 minutes.  It will not cost you anything 
to be a part of the study.  If you do not wish to participate in the study, correctional 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
FWA: 00007392 | IRB: 0004173 
 
2043 College Way | UC Box A-133 | Forest Grove, OR 97116 
P. 503-352-1478 | F. 503-352-1447 | www.pacificu.edu/research/irb 
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staff will escort you back to your housing unit.  A researcher will be present at all 
times to answer any questions you might have. 
6. Risks, Risk Reduction Steps, and Clinical Alternatives 
a. Anticipated Risks and Strategies to Minimize or Avoid Risk 
This study poses minimal risk to participants.  There are no foreseen physical, 
economic, or legal risks to participants.  Social and emotional risks are minimal 
and may include discomfort at considering personal prejudices and minor 
character flaws.  If you begin to feel this way, you can talk to a counselor at 
Behavioral Health Services or a staff member you trust. 
b. Unknown Risks 
It is possible that participation in this study may expose you to currently 
unforeseeable risks.  
c. Advantageous Clinical Alternatives 
This study does not involve experimental clinical investigation(s). 
 
7. Adverse Event Handling and Reporting Plan 
In the event that you become sick, injured, distressed, or otherwise uncomfortable as 
a result of your involvement in the research study, you may stop your participation 
immediately. If such an event occurs, promptly notify the principal investigator or the 
Pacific University Institutional Review Board.  If your distress does not go away 
before you leave the study location, we will recommend that you contact Behavioral 
Health Services to talk to someone about your concerns. 
If the investigator(s) become aware of an adverse event, the IRB office will be 
notified by the next normal business day for minor events (reports of discomfort as a 
result of participation) and within 24 hours for major events (reports of extreme 
distress as a result of participation). 
If you experience or are directly affected by an adverse event, you will be given the 
opportunity to withdraw any data collected from you during the study up until after 
you have submitted your responses to the survey. 
 
8. Direct Benefits and/or Payment to Participants 
a. Benefit(s) 
There is no direct benefit to you as a study participant.  Participation in this study 
will in no way influence parole decisions, or inmate standing or benefits. 
b. Payment(s) or Reward(s) 
Participants will not be paid for their participation. 
 
9. Promise of Privacy 
The results of this study will be confidential.  A private number, not your name or 
State Identification Number (SID) number, will identify the answers to your survey, 
so that no one can match your name or SID number with your answers except for the 
investigators.  Your SID number and name, which we need so we can keep track of 
who takes the survey, will be kept on a separate piece of paper in a locked file cabinet 
inside a locked office.  Your name and study ID number will also be kept on an 
electronic list, which will be kept on a password-protected computer that only the 
investigators have access to.  The lists with your name, SID number, and study ID 
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number will be destroyed once the data has been analyzed and the study is complete.  
All the surveys will be carried in and out of ODOC in a locked briefcase that nobody 
but the principal investigator can open. 
While you are taking the survey, all rules and regulations of ODOC still count.  For 
example, if you write on the surveys or tell the researcher that you or someone else 
was physically harmed the researcher will have to tell a staff member.  The researcher 
will also have to notify the IRB at Pacific University within 24 hours. 
 
10. Voluntary Nature of the Study 
Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future 
relations with Pacific University or ODOC. If you decide to participate, you are free 
to not answer any question or withdraw at any time without prejudice or negative 
consequences. If you choose to withdraw after beginning the study we will not use 
your answers on the surveys you already completed.  However, you will not be able 
to withdraw once you have completed all the measures and your materials have been 
collected.  We will keep all surveys for our records in a locked cabinet for 5 years.  If 
significant new findings develop (or are discovered) during the course of this research 
that could impact your decision to continue participation, such findings will be shared 
with you and you will be given the opportunity to withdraw from the study. 
 
11. Contacts and Questions 
The investigator(s) will be happy to answer any questions you may have at any time 
during the course of the study. If you are not satisfied with the answers you receive, 
please call the Pacific University Institutional Review Board at 503-352-1478 to 
discuss your questions or concerns further. If you have questions about your rights as 
a research subject, or if you experience a research-related injury of any kind, please 
contact the investigator(s) and/or the IRB office. All concerns and questions will be 
kept in confidence. 
 
12. Statement of Consent 
 
YES  NO  
   I am 18 years of age or over. 
   All my questions have been answered. 
   I have read and understand the description of my participation duties. 
   I have been offered a copy of this form to keep for my records. 
   
I voluntarily agree to participate in this study and understand that I may 
withdraw at any time without consequence. 
 
   
Signature  Date 
 
  Participant 
Printed Full Name  Study Role 
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Signature  Date 
 
   
Printed Full Name  Study Role* 
 
*This individual must be trained in obtaining informed consent and have authorization 
from the principal investigator and/or faculty advisor to do. 
 
